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Anti-Discrimination Law-MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION: PUBLIC
SCORN OF PERSONAL CHOICES-State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.
1990)
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places,
close to home-so close and so small that they cannot be seen on
any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual per-
son: the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends;
the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places
where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal op-
portunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these
rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere.
Eleanor Roosevelt'
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INTRODUCTION
The elimination of invidious discrimination is a fundamental goal
of the state of Minnesota.2 This goal is embodied within Minnesota's
1. E. Roosevelt, Remarks to United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 27,
1958), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED 166 (S.
Platt ed. 1989).
2. See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984). The Supreme
Court of the United States noted that Minnesota's Human Rights Act reflects the
"State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination" and "plainly
serves compelling state interests of the highest order." Id. See also United States
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766-68 (Minn. 1981).
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Human Rights Act (Act) which is based on the public policy of secur-
ing its residents freedom from discrimination.3 The Act reflects
Minnesota's commitment to provide its citizenry with the freedom to
make choices which are crucial to the exercise of personal liberty.4
Yet, despite the protections afforded by the antidiscrimination legis-
lation, the rights of residents are jeopardized when judicial interven-
tion denies the rights which state law purports to protect.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's recent decision, State v. French,5
provides an example of judicial denial of the right to secure housing
without regard to marital status. The court examined the language
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which governs the criteria for
tenant selection, and upheld a landlord's refusal to rent property to a
prospective tenant because of the applicant's unmarried status and
intent to live in the house with her fianc6. The court determined that
the applicant-tenant was not a member of the class afforded protec-
tion on the basis of "marital status."
The court's decision emphasizes the importance of a precise re-
view of the Legislature's intent to provide protected classes with
equal access to housing. Because there are no affirmative guidelines
which otherwise regulate tenant selection, it is critical that the court
accurately identify the protected classes. This Note will examine the
meaning of the term "marital status" as intended by the Legislature
and as embodied within the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
I. LANDLORDS AND TENANTS
A. State v. French
On February 22, 1988, a Minnesota landlord, Lyle French, entered
into an agreement to rent his house to Susan Parsons, who re-
sponded to his newspaper advertisement.6 Prior to the agreement,
French learned of Parsons' intention to live in the house with her
fianc& Two days later, French rescinded the agreement. French re-
fused to rent to Parsons because he believed that she would engage
3. MINN. STAT. § 363.12, subd. 1 (1990). The Act's declaration of policy states:
"It is the public policy of this state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from
discrimination ... [i]n housing and real property because of... marital status ....
Id.
4. Article I is the bill of rights for citizens of the state. Section 2 of Article I
pertains to citizens' rights and privileges. It states in part: "No member of this state
shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers." MINN.
CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
5. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
6. Id. at 3. French once occupied this house in Marshall, Minnesota. He even-
tually moved out of the house, but decided to rent the property before it was sold.
[Vol. 17
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in sexual relations with her fianc6 in the house.7 In addition, French
asserted that the cohabitation of two adults of the opposite sex was
morally wrong and violated his religious convictions.8
After French's decision, Parsons filed a marital discrimination
charge against him with the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights.9 The Department conducted an investigation and issued a
complaint against French. The administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled
that French violated the law prohibiting marital status discrimina-
tion.1O The ALJ awarded to Parsons compensatory damages, dam-
ages for mental suffering and, in addition, assessed a civil penalty to
be paid to the state of Minnesota by French. I The Minnesota Court
of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's ruling.' 2 In 1990, the Minnesota
Supreme Court granted French's petition for further review and re-
versed the decision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held French's refusal to rent to
Parsons on the basis of his religious beliefs was not a violation of the
Act. 13 The court's 4-3 decision turned on an issue of statutory con-
struction.'4 Justice Yetka, writing for the majority, stated that the
Legislature did not intend to protect unmarried couples from hous-
ing discrimination on the basis of marital status.' 5 Consequently,
landlords are permitted to deny access to housing solely because the
prospective tenants are members of the opposite sex and unmarried.
Although three of the justices also based their decision on a state
constitutional analysis, Justice Simonett concurred in the decision,
basing his analysis solely on the statutory construction issue.' 6 In a
strong dissent, ChiefJustice Popovich stated that the majority's deci-
7. French, 460 N.W.2d at 4. Neither Parsons nor her fiance answered French
when he questioned whether they planned to have sexual relations on the property.
French apparently inferred that the couple would engage in sexual relations. Id. In
his answer to the complaint, French alleges that renting his property to Parsons
would force him to violate Minnesota's fornication statute. See Brief of Respondent
at app. 5, State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (DHR No. H 1812).
8. French, 460 N.W.2d at 3. French believed that two unmarried adults living
together constituted the "'appearance of evil' " and that couples living together or
having sexual relations outside of marriage are sinful. Id. at 4.
9. French, 460 N.W.2d at 4; Brief of Respondent at app. 3, French, 460 N.W.2d at
2 (DHR No. H 1812).
10. French, 460 N.W.2d at 4.
11. Brief for Respondent at app. 20, French, 460 N.W.2d at 2 (DHR No. H 1812).
12. French, 460 N.W.2d at 3.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (1990). The statute prohibits fornication and
states: "When any man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other,
each is guilty of fornication, which is a misdemeanor." See also id. § 363.01, subd. 40
(defining marital status).
15. French, 460 N.W. 2d at 6.
16. Id. at 11 (Justice Simonett concurred as to the statutory construction issue
but did not reach the constitutional questions.).
1991]
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sion "misconstrues legislative history, public policy and the facts
presented to reach a result contrary to this court's interpretation of
the [Minnesota Human Rights Act]."'7 Chief Justice Popovich ar-
gued, in part, that religious and moral values "include not discrimi-
nating against others solely because of their color, sex, or whom they
live with ... "18
The court's holding is based on the Legislature's definition of mar-
ital status discrimination.19 The analysis centers on the interpreta-
tion of legislative intent in light of two issues: (1) whether the Act's
prohibition against marital status discrimination extends protection
to unmarried cohabiters in their access to housing, and (2) whether




Historically, the law permitted a landlord to refuse property rental
to prospective tenants on any grounds the landlord chose. 20 This
common law right is illustrated in the New York case of Kramarsky v.
Stahl Management Co.21 The Kramarsky court affirmed a landlord's
right to refuse rental housing to a prospective tenant because the
prospective tenant was an attorney22 and might prove to be diffi-
cult.23 The court concluded that there was nothing illegal about dis-
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 6-7. Although the court based its holding on statutory interpretation of
marital status discrimination, the plurality opinion addressed the landlord's constitu-
tional rights of religious freedom under the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 8-11.
This note will not discuss the constitutional arguments or issues raised by this dicta.
20. R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 11.1 (1980 &
Supp. 1991) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW] (Generally, a landlord's basis for tenant
selection remained unchecked until the 1960s.).
21. 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977) (A black, female attorney as-
serted she was denied housing because of her race, gender and marital status.).
22. Id. at 1031, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 944. The landlord submitted documentation
that 30% of apartments had been rented to blacks and 60% of apartments had been
rented to unmarried people to support his contention that complainant's sex or race
were not at issue. Id.
23. The New York court stated:
Absent a supervening statutory proscription, a landlord is free to do what he
wishes with his property, and to rent or not to rent to any given person at
his whim. The only restraints which the law has imposed upon free exercise
of his discretion is that he may not use race, creed, color, national origin,
sex or marital status as criteria. So, regrettable though it may be, a landlord
can employ other criteria to determine the acceptability of his tenants-oc-
cupational, physical or otherwise. He may decide not to rent to singers be-
cause they are too noisy, or not to rent to baldheaded men because he has
been told they give wild parties. He can bar his premises to the lowest strata
of society, should he choose, or to the highest, if that be his personal desire.
[Vol. 17
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/15
MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION
criminating against attorneys as a class and the landlord's subjective
evaluation was permitted by law.
24
The civil rights movement of the 1960s prompted the United
States Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1968.25 In doing so,
Congress protected against landlord discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion or national origin.26 The Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act of 1974 further expanded the protected
grounds to include discrimination on the basis of gender.
27
The fair housing section of the Civil Rights Act exempts certain
categories from its provisions, including the rental of single family
housing when the landlord does not own more than three such
units28 and residences which are operated by religious organizations
or private clubs which are used on a noncommercial basis.29 It also
exempts rooms or dwelling units which are intended for occupation
for up to four families if the owner occupies one of the units as her
residence.3 0 Although the Act entitles a landlord to discriminate in
tenant selection, the landlord is prohibited from advertising the in-
tent to so discriminate. 3'
Id. at 1032, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
24. The court also briefly addressed the restrictions of the state's human rights
act but upheld the prevailing position that a landlord has total discretion in tenant
selection on any basis which is not prohibited. Id
25. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 89 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988)). The fair housing section, Title VIII,
states:
[I]t shall be unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facili-
ties in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
26. See id. (also providing protection to other types of real estate transactions).
27. Id. §§ 3604-3606, 3631.
28. Id. § 3603(b) (Exemption applies only where owner does not use a real estate
service/agent.).
29. Id. § 3607 (Exemption applies provided that the religion itself does not re-
strict membership on basis of race, color, or national origin.).
30. Id. § 3603(b)(2) (Four families may live independently of one another.).
31. This section states:
It shall be unlawful .. .[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed or published any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,
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State-enacted antidiscrimination statutes provide similar protec-
tion in access to fair housing.3 2 Cumulatively, these federal and state
legislative decisions provided the first constraints on a landlord's cri-
teria for tenant selection.33
While most states have enacted legislation that prohibits discrimi-
nation against tenants or prospective tenants,34 there is considerable
deviation between these statutes. For example, statutes vary in the
scope, the identity of the protected classes, the grounds which con-
stitute illegal discrimination and the remedies available.3 5 Many
state statutes extend the protection offered by the federal law to in-
clude coverage on grounds such as age, marital status and families
with children.3 6
2. Tenant Selection
An underlying assumption of antidiscrimination law is that there
are criteria in which a landlord has no legitimate interest and which
may not be utilized in assessing a potential tenant. 37 There are,
however, legitimate considerations which a landlord may use as a ba-
sis for tenant selection. Of foremost concern is a prospective ten-
ant's ability to pay the rent.38 In addition, the landlord may be
concerned with preserving the value of the property and thus may
choose a tenant who will not inflict damage during the tenancy.3 9
The criteria for tenant selection, therefore, would include considera-
32. See AMERICAN LAW, supra note 20, at § 11.1 (Civil rights movement also
prompted enactment of state antidiscrimination legislation.).
33. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. See also AMERICAN LAW, supra
note 20, at § 11.1 (A few jurisdictions prohibited certain types of discrimination
against tenants before the 1960s.).
34. AMERICAN LAw, supra note 20, at § 11.9 (Legislation prohibiting some type of
discrimination has been adopted in about two-thirds of the states.).
35. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980) (prohibiting discrimination
because of race, color, religion, gender, marital status, national origin or ancestry);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (prohibiting discrimination on
basis of handicap, race, creed, color, gender, marital status, religion, national origin,
or ancestry).
36. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1986) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of
marital status or changes in marital status); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1989)
(prohibiting discrimination in renting because of children in family); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 37.2502 (1985) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of age).
37. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing federal prohibi-
tions); see also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing state
prohibitions).
38. See Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employment Discrimination
Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 583 (1986) [hereinafter
Note, Business Necessity] (recognizing that "[t]he tenant's ability to pay lies at the core
of the landlord's concerns").
39. Id. at 584.
[Vol. 17
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tion of such factors as income,40 and credit and rental history.41
Except for the considerations prohibited by federal and state dis-
crimination statutes which enforce fair access to housing for the pro-
tected classes, the common law still applies. The landlord may make
tenancy decisions based on personal taste.42 Thus, the importance
of accurately identifying the classes which the Legislature intended
to protect becomes critical in the enforcement of antidiscrimination
law.4 3 Otherwise, a prospective tenant who should receive statutory
protection may be unfairly denied choice of housing.
III. THE MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
The Act provides:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice ... to refuse to sell, rent, or
lease or otherwise deny to or withhold from any person or group of
persons any real property because of race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public
assistance, disability, or familial status .... 44
The public policy which the statute is intended to promote is free-
dom from discrimination45 in securing housing and real property. 46
To accomplish this objective, the Act should be construed liberally.47
The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently held that the "reme-
dial nature of the Minnesota Human Rights Act requires liberal con-
struction of its terms." 48 The court has recognized this liberal
40. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 2(l)(a), (b) (1990) (A landlord may not dis-
criminate against individuals who receive public assistance, unless exempted from
compliance by MINN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 2(l)(b) (1990).).
41. See Note, Business Necessity, supra note 38, at 584 (Reversion interest of the
landlord is proper consideration in the selection of a tenant.).
42. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (Except for statutory provisions
providing protection from certain types of discrimination, a landlord may discrimi-
nate on any grounds.).
43. The Act states: "It is the public policy of this state to secure for persons in
this state, freedom from discrimination ...." MINN. STAT. § 363.12, subd. 1 (1990).
"The opportunity to obtain.., housing.., is hereby recognized as and declared to
be a civil right." Id. § 363.12, subd. 2.
44. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 2 (1)(a) (1990).
45. See City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 86, 239 N.W.2d 197,
201 (1976) (Discrimination means the "distinction in treatment of individuals based
upon impermissible or irrelevant factors such as race, color, sex, etc."); MINN. STAT.
§ 363.01, subd. 14 (1990) (The term "discriminate" means to separate or
segregate.).
46. MINN. STAT. § 363.12, subd. 1(2) (1990) (Employment is similarly protected
but is not applicable in this situation.).
47. Id. § 363.11 (1990).
48. See Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 264
(Minn. 1984) (upholding the broad prohibition of the Act against arbitrary classifica-
tion); City of Minneapolis v. State, 310 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 1981) (holding "race"
discrimination included discrimination for association with persons of another race);
1991]
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construction in its interpretation of marital status discrimination.49
The Minnesota Supreme Court first interpreted the language of
the Act regarding unfair discriminatory practice in Minneapolis v.
Richardson.50 In this case of first impression, the court established a
standard for unfair discriminatory practice.5' A finding of discrimi-
nation in the area of public services may be made when the record
establishes either the adverse treatment of one or more persons be-
cause the existence of a factor such as race, color, gender, or when
the treatment accorded is so unreasonable that discrimination is the
probable explanation.52
The analysis of discrimination claims under the Act requires the
application of a three part analysis 5 developed in the adjudication of
claims arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.54 The
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted this analysis.55 A plaintiff
presents a prima facie case of discrimination;56 the defendant an-
swers the plaintiff's showing;5 7 and the plaintiff rebuts this evidence
of nondiscrimination.58 In order to establish a prima facie case of
Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980) (holding gender dis-
crimination included employer inaction in face of sexually derogatory statements and
verbal sexual advances directed at one employee by fellow employees); City of Min-
neapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 89, 239 N.W.2d 197, 203 (1976) (holding Act
should be liberally construed to aid in eliminating discrimination in public services).
49. See Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979) (The court en-
dorsed a broad construction of "marital status" to prohibit employment discrimina-
tion based on the identity or situation of one's spouse in addition to whether an
individual was or was not married.).
50. 307 Minn. 80, 85, 239 N.W.2d 197, 201 (1976).
51. Id. at 89, 239 N.W.2d at 203.
52. Id. at 87, 239 N.W.2d at 202 (establishing standard to serve as a guide to the
evaluation of evidence in discrimination cases).
53. See Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719-22 (Minn. 1986) (re-
manding case for findings and conclusions in specific conformance with the three-
part analysis previously adopted).
54. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing four-part analysis in Title VII cases);
Hubbard v. UPI, 330 N.W.2d 428, 441 (Minn. 1983) (applying the test developed to
interpret federal law to Minnesota law cases because of the similarities between the
two statutes).
55. Danz v.Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn. 1978) (Plaintiff alleged employ-
ment-based sex discrimination.).
56. Id. at 399 (Only the "bare essentials of unequal treatment based" on gender
is required for a proper prima facie case.).
57. Id. at 400 (Defendant must submit proper, admissible and relevant evidence
to rebut the plaintiff's showing.).
58. Id. at 402 (Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to answer defendant's re-
buttal evidence.); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252-56 (1981) (identifying the respective burdens of persuasion and production in
disparate treatment discrimination claims under Title VII); Sigurdson v. Isanti
County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 722 (Minn. 1986) (discussing employment discrimination
on the basis of gender); Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 428 (discussing employment dis-
[Vol. 17
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discrimination, the plaintiff must be a member of a protected class,
meet the minimum qualifications of the job, have been denied em-
ployment despite the qualifications, and the defendant must have
continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications.59
In order to rebut the evidence presented, the employer must show
a legitimate reason for the discriminatory conduct.60 In real prop-
erty situations, the landlord/owner would need to show that the con-
duct fell within one of the exceptions provided by the Legislature6l
or that the conduct was otherwise permissible.62
In French, the landlord refused to rent the property to Parsons be-
cause she intended to live in the house with her fianc6.63 The marital
status of the prospective tenant constituted the sole basis for the
landlord's refusal to rent. Two issues arise as to the landlord's rejec-
tion of this otherwise suitable tenant. The first is whether the refusal
to rent to an applicant-tenant based on an intention to live with a
member of the opposite sex constitutes marital status discrimination,
and the second is whether a landlord is permitted to inquire into the
marital status of prospective tenants and to use the information (or
refusal to provide the requested information) as a basis for tenancy
decisions.64
A. Marital Status Discrimination
There are no federal laws which specifically prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of marital status. Marital status discrimination is
not covered by Title V11165 or its amendment, the Fair Housing Act
crimination on basis of disability); State v. Mower County Social Servs., 434 N.W.2d
494, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing employment discrimination on basis of
marital status).
59. See Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 399 (discussing gender-based employment discrimi-
nation); Mower, 434 N.W.2d at 498 (discussing marital status discrimination; employ-
ment refused after applicant disclosed that she was unmarried and pregnant); State v.
Hennepin County, 420 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing employ-
ment discrimination on basis of disability).
60. See Department of Human Rights v. Spiten, 424 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (A prima facie case of refusal to rent based on race discrimination must
be rebutted with lawful nondiscriminatory reasons for such conduct.); State by Rob-
erts v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 365 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Phys-
ical inability to perform job duties is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
employer's conduct.).
61. See State v. Parkshore Estates, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(One such exemption provided by the Legislature is separation of families from non-
families.).
62. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
63. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4-5 (1990) (Landlord refused to rent to un-
married woman because cohabitation is sinful and constitutes the "appearance of
evil.").
64. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 2(2)(c) (1990).
65. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair
19911
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of 1988.66 However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196467 has
been used to attack marital status discrimination as a form of gender
discrimination in the employment context. 68 In marital status dis-
crimination cases, Title VII claims require that the plaintiff present a
prima facie case 6 9 showing that the employment policy resulted in
either disparate treatment7 0 or disparate impact7t on one gender.
Under Title VII, rules that have no adverse impact on one gender
are generally not unlawful.72 The claim of marital status discrimina-
tion under the Civil Rights Act has not been an effective remedy.73
Thus, many states have enacted antidiscrimination statutes which
prohibit discrimination based on "marital status." 74
Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1106 (1989) [hereinafter Fair Housing] (Marital status
discrimination is clearly not covered by Title VIII.).
66. See id. at 1107 (The only way to extend coverage to marital status is if marital
status rules carry disparate racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based impact.).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); Section 2000e-2a(2) provides that an
employer may not "limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
§ 2000e-2a(2).
68. Note, Marital Status Discrimination: A Survey of Federal Case Law, 85 W. VA. L.
REV. 347, 348 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Marital Status].
69. See id. at 350-51 (discussing requirements of a prima facie case in marital
status discrimination claim under Title VII).
70. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1971)
(Company policy prohibiting only female flight attendants from marrying was unlaw-
ful gender discrimination because the rule adversely impacted on women; the court
relied in part on the EEOC Guidelines for sex discrimination.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971).
71. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (Facially neutral standard
must disproportionately exclude a protected class from employment.).
72. See Gelb & Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act: A Viable State
Remedy For Employment Discrimination, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1055, 1085 (1983) (pointing
out that marital status discrimination has been found illegal in certain situations
which adversely impact women). See also Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892
(5th Cir. 1977) (Company's policy of refusing to hire married flight attendants does
not violate Title VII since there is no dissimilarity in treatment between the sexes.).
73. See Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977) (Com-
pany's no spouse rule was job-related and did not violate Title VII.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 934 (1978); Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 414 (8th Cir.
1975) (Policy which prohibited employment of spouses within the same department
had no disparate impact on women and thus did not constitute gender discrimina-
tion.); Tuck v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 39, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Employer's
no-close relative rule which prohibited female employee from transferring into hus-
band's employment area did not constitute gender discrimination.); see generally Note,
Marital Status, supra note 68 (discussing the difficulties involved in maintaining a Title
VII claim); see infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing no-spouse rule).
74. See Note, Marital Status, supra note 68, at 360; see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.240 (1986); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12955 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-502 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (1986); D.C. CODE §§ 1-2512, 1-2515
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While federal law does not protect against marital status discrimi-
nation, Minnesota prohibits real property and employment discrimi-
nation on this basis.7 5 In 1988, the Legislature added the definition
of marital status discrimination to the Act.76 Marital status is defined
to mean "whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced,
separated, or a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes
protection against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situa-
tion, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse."
77
The definition itself potentially encompasses three different types
of claims: (1) those based on the person's marital relation with an-
other individual (e.g., whether a person is married to another em-
ployee of a company); (2) those based on a person's individual
relation to the marital status; and (3) those based on living arrange-
ments, including cohabitation with another adult who is not a
spouse. 78
Prior to French, Minnesota case law did not address the issue of
marital status discrimination in the context of access to housing.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the case law which exists in the
context of employment. The Minnesota Legislature's intent in the
area of housing will then be compared with the Legislature's intent
in the employment setting.
1. Marital Status Discrimination in Employment
The first type of marital status discrimination is one in which an
employer refuses to employ an individual because the spouse is al-
(1987); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (1975 & Supp. 1990); HAw. REV. STAT. § 515-3
(1988 & Supp. 1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 3-102 (1988); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, § 20 (1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 4 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAws § 37.2502
(1990); MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1989); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (IV)(V) (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (a), (f), (g)(1)
(West 1976 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 396 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-37-4 (1984); WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.60.222 (1990); Wis. STAT. § 101.22 (1988).
75. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2161-64.
76. Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 660, § 1, 1988 Minn. Laws 918 (Prior to 1988, the
courts interpreted the meaning of the term "marital status.").
77. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 24 (1990) (Prior to the 1988 definition, the court
refused to interpret marital status in the employment context to include the identity
or situation of spouse.).
78. Unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples are similarly affected by
discrimination on the basis of marital status. Besides discrimination in housing and
employment, both may face denial of social security, tax and insurance benefits be-
cause of their marital status. However, homosexual couples are not allowed the op-
portunity to gain the legal rights of marriage, whereas unmarried heterosexual
couples may obtain those rights at any time by marrying. The denial of a legal right
to marriage and the resulting benefits which are denied to homosexual couples is
beyond the scope of this article and better addressed by a discussion of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation.
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ready employed by the company. In Kraft, Inc. v. State,79 several part-
time employees were denied full-time positions with the company
because each was married to a full-time employee of the company.SO
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that this practice constitutes
marital status discrimination.81 The court endorsed the broad defi-
nition of marital status to include not only whether an individual was
married, but also the identity or situation of one's spouse.8 2 The
court further stated that the Legislature's intent was to prohibit this
type of marital status discrimination by an employer, unless a busi-
ness necessity existed which entitled the company to an exemption.8 3
The business necessity had to meet the criteria of a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification.8
4
The second type of claim involves the mere status of being mar-
ried or unmarried. Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held
that the refusal to hire an applicant because of marital status or preg-
nancy constituted an unfair employment practice under the Act.85 In
State v. Mower County Social Services, an employer refused to hire a
qualified applicant after the employer discovered the applicant's un-
married, pregnant state. The ALJ found sufficient evidence to sup-
port the finding that the woman was not hired because of her marital
status and pregnancy.8 6 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
which included an award for mental anguish.87
Two Minnesota cases involve the third type of marital status dis-
79. 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979).
80. Id. at 387. This policy is often known as the "no-spouse rule."
81. Id. Absent a bona fide occupational qualification for the antinepotism rule,
the no-spouse practice constitutes marital status discrimination.
82. Id. at 388; contra Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d
256, 259 (Minn. 1984) (refusing to extend interpretation of marital status discrimina-
tion to include the identity or situation of the spouse).
83. See Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388. "To justify such an employment policy, an
employer must advance a bona fide occupational qualification which will withstand
the strict scrutiny of a reviewing court. Mere business convenience is insufficient."
Id.
84. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1 (1990) (Statute does not specifically define
a bona fide occupational qualification.); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988) (Bona fide
occupational qualification is not specifically defined.); see also Note, Marital Status,
supra note 68, at 351 (discussing bona fide occupational qualifications; an employer's
defense is usually that discriminatory policy is necessary to operation of the em-
ployer's business, thus entitling employer to discriminate).
85. See State v. Mower County Social Servs., 434 N.W.2d 494, 495 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (County agency refused to hire qualified applicant despite her merit sys-
tem ranking of number one out of seven applicants.).
86. Id. at 497 (Defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring applicant
were a pretext for discrimination.).
87. Id. at 500 (Act authorizes damages for mental anguish.).
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crimination claim. In State v. Sports and Health Club, Inc. ,88 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court affirmed an ALJ's findings that an employer's
refusal to hire persons believed to be engaging in fornication consti-
tuted discrimination based on marital status.8 9 In this case, the own-
ers of a health club questioned prospective employees about their
marital status and whether they engaged in premarital or extramari-
tal sexual relations.90 The court stated that the employer's question-
ing went beyond the bounds9' permitted by the Act and affirmed the
ALJ's finding that at least two applicants were not hired on the basis
of marital status discrimination.92
In State v. Porter Farnu, Inc. ,93 an employer issued an ultimatum to a
male employee that he would have to marry the woman with whom
he lived or have her move out of his home. Otherwise, the employee
would be terminated. 94 The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed
the ALJ's finding that the employee's termination constituted marital
status discrimination. The court stated that the supreme court's
holding in State v. Sports and Health Club, Inc. extended the protection
of the Act to unmarried couples. 95
In each of these cases, an employer sought to evaluate factors
other than the job skills of the individual.96 The employer ceased
88. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) (Action was brought against a for-profit,
closely-held Minnesota corporation.).
89. Id. at 854. See also State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc. HR-82-005-RL, slip
op. at 29 (OAH Apr. 26, 1984) (The ALJ's finding of "marital status" discrimination
included refusal to hire because individuals lived with adults of the opposite sex.).
90. See Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 850 (Employer's questioning regard-
ing religion and marital status pervaded the interview process.).
91. See Sports & Health Club, HR-82-005-RL, slip op. at 50 (OAH Apr. 26, 1984)
(ALJ found that the marital status and sex based questions went beyond permissible
grounds: "[Tlhey ask single persons who live away from home whom they live with
and, if they live with an unrelated member of the opposite sex to whom they are
romantically attached, they presume he/she is a fornicator and will not hire them.").
92. Id.
93. 382 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (Defendant is a family-owned sub-
chapter S corporation which consists of dairy and crop farming.).
94. Id. at 546 (Complainant was hired to work in the dairy operation and lived in
a trailer house on defendant's farm.).
95. Id. at 547 (Court rejected complainant's contention that marital status dis-
crimination did not include protection from discharge because of a sexual relation-
ship with a member of the opposite sex.).
96. See State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) (Un-
married applicants were denied employment because they lived with adults of oppo-
site sex.); Kraft v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1979) (Complainants were
refused full-time employment because they were married to full-time employees of
the defendant-company.); State v. Mower County Social Servs., 434 N.W.2d 494, 495
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (A qualified applicant was refused employment because of
unmarried, pregnant status.); State v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (Complainant was discharged from employment when he refused to
either marry or terminate his living arrangement with an adult of the opposite sex.).
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functioning as a businessperson and became a judge of the em-
ployee's personal conduct and choices.97 In all three possible defini-
tions of marital status, Minnesota courts have held that this practice
by employers constitutes discrimination, and individuals are pro-
tected under the Act. 9 8
2. Is a Prospective Tenant's Access to Housing Protected?
a. Legislative Intent
The French court held that the definition of marital status discrimi-
nation applied in Sports and Health Club did not apply to housing cases
because the Legislature intended different effects for housing and
employment cases.99 The court examined both the language and
legislative intent of the statute and held that the Legislature did not
intend to extend protection from housing discrimination to unmar-
ried couples. O0
The prohibition against marital status discrimination was included
in the Act in 1973.101 An examination of the legislative history of
this amendment reveals that the Legislature specifically considered
and balanced O2 the right of a single person to live with a member of
97. See Note, Marital Status, supra note 68, at 347 (Employer evaluated matters
which lie in the private domain of the individual.).
98. See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
99. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990). The court noted that the
definition of marital status should not apply in this case because it did not become
effective until August 1, 1988. Id. at 5. Yet, the court used the 1988 definition to
justify the court's holding in this case. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the legislative intent for the 1973 Act amendment.
100. Id. at 6-7 (Court examined the legislative history of the subdivision to discern
the Legislature's intent.).
101. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2163.
102. See Hearing on S.F. 419 Before the Subcomm. onJud. Admin. of the Senate
Jud. Comm., 68th Minn. Leg., Apr. 20, 1973 (audio tape) (tape on file at the Legisla-
tive Reference Library). Senator Robert Tennessen, one of the bill's authors, dis-
cussed the scope of the proposed amendment with Phyllis Janey, President of the
League of Minnesota Human Rights Commissioners:
Janey: Well, in landlord-tenant relationship, I guess I think that we've come
to find that there does need to be some attention paid to the rights of ten-
ants where property owners are offering that property for income. That
then there are certain kinds of restraint that can, and perhaps should, be
imposed on them for the benefit of renters.
Tennessen: Well, I am sure you understand that I agree with that in a way
since I authored the bill. The question I have, put it this way, if Mrs. Mur-
phy has a one-room she rents out and Mrs. Murphy wants it as a room for
two people and she does not want to rent that to two people of the opposite
sex who are not married. Do you think under the bill she can do that?
Janey: Well, I don't believe that Mrs. Murphy, you know, ought to have some
sort of right to supervise the lives of her tenants, you know, provided that
they do not invade her privacy.
Tennessen: But, Mrs.Janey suppose this is very offensive to her, totally offen-
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the opposite sex and the objections which a property owner might
have to the tenant's living arrangement.103 The Legislature pro-
vided that a landlord may discriminate on the basis of gender, mari-
tal status, or status with regard to public assistance or disability if the
landlord lives on the premises.104 Landlords who do not live on the
premises, however, are precluded from discriminating on any basis
specified by the Act. 05
The partial exemption provided by the Legislature recognizes the
right of a landlord, who lives in close proximity to a tenant, to dis-
criminate.10 6 Once the landlord enters into the commercial market-
place, however, the right to discriminate on the basis of marital
status is prohibited by the Act. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature
intended to provide protection to single individuals like Parsons who
live with individuals of the opposite sex.
The French court ignored the 1973 legislative intent to prohibit
marital status discrimination for unmarried persons who choose to
live together. Instead, the court examined the language of the mari-
tal status definition enacted by the Legislature in 1988. This defini-
tion includes broader language in the context of employment cases.
As defined by the statute: "Marital status means whether a person is
single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving
sive to her to have two unmarried people living in her rooms. And because
she is living there, you know, it just bothers her. Now is that situation any
substantially different or do you think it's different from the, you know, the
large apartment complex or, you know, where owners don't normally
super[vise] or live in close proximity to their tenants, etc.?
Janey: No, I don't and I guess .. well, for one thing Senator Tennessen, I
hope you are aware that St. Paul has no such protection for the mythical
Mrs. Murphy and you know I am not aware of any terrible hardship that
women who rent property in their homes are suffering in the city of St. Paul.
This also, this kind of permission to discriminate, was dropped in Wiscon-
sin, Iowa, Wisconsin, I think. Yes, and the world didn't come to an end for
renters of property.
The full Senate Judiciary Committee met on May 8, 1973. Senator Nicholas
Coleman, the chief author of the bill stated: "And marital status we declared an un-
fair practice to discriminate in employment and in housing with an important excep-
tion, Mrs. Murphy's boarding house."
103. See MINN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 2(l)(a), (b) (1990). This exemption provides
that section 363.03, subdivision 2, shall not apply to:
(a) rooms in a temporary or permanent residence home run by a nonprofit
organization, if the discrimination is by sex; or
(b) the rental by a resident owner or occupier of a one-family accommoda-
tion of a room or rooms in the accommodation to another person or per-
sons if the discrimination is by sex, marital status, status with regard to
public assistance or disability.
Id.
104. Id. § 363.02, subd. 2(l)(b).
105. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
106. This exemption is more restrictive than the exemptions provided in Title
VIII. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection against dis-
crimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs
of a spouse or former spouse."t07 Because of this language, the
court stated: "[T]his new definition shows that, in non-employment
cases, the legislature intended to address only the status of an individ-
ual, not an individual's relationship with a spouse, fianc6, fianc&e, or
other domestic partner." 0 8
The Legislature included the definition of marital status in the Act
as a direct result of the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Cybyske
v. Independent School District No. 196.109 In that case, the court refused
to extend the Act's interpretation of marital status discrimination to
include the identity or situation of the plaintiff's spouse.t" 0 In
Cybyske, the plaintiff-teacher was not hired for a teaching position be-
cause of the allegedly political pro-teacher views of her husband. I 1I
Although purporting to adhere to a broad interpretation of marital
status," 12 the court held that employment discrimination based on
107. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 24 (1990).
108. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990) (emphasis in original) (Court
determined the broad language used to describe prohibited discrimination in em-
ployment indicates that the Legislature considered employment and housing cases
differently.).
109. 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1984); see generally Note, Civil Rights-Employment Dis-
crimination Based on Marital Status-Cybyske v. Independent School District No. 196,
347 N. W2d 256 (Minn. 1984), 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 277 (1985).
110. See Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 261 (Complainant asserted that she was refused
employment because her husband espoused pro-teacher views and held a school
board position in a neighboring school district.).
111. Id. at 259 (Plaintiff's husband was elected to the district school board on a
pro-teacher platform.).
112. Id. at 260. Significantly, Justice Yetka joined in the dissent ofJustice Wahl in
the Cybyske decision, arguing that the majority opinion narrowed the broad construc-
tion given marital status in Kraft, Inc. v. State. Justice Wahl stated:
We recognized in Kraft that '[bly including marital status within the parame-
ters of the Human Rights Act, the legislature clearly intended to outlaw ar-
bitrary classifications relating to marriage.' We found further that, in
acknowledging the fundamental nature of the marriage relationship in the
Act, the legislature intended that an employer may differentiate on the basis
of marital status only where a business necessity is compelling and
overriding.
Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
In Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979), the court stated:
We reject the view that 'marital status,' while it denotes the fact that one is
or is not married, does not embrace the identity or situation of one's spouse.
Since respondent does employ married, single and divorced individuals, to
hold otherwise would condone discrimination against a portion of a pro-
tected class, i.e.,job applicants already married to full-time Kraft employees.
To do so would ignore the broad prohibition against arbitrary classifications
embodied in the Human Rights Act and would elevate form over substance.
Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
The majority in Cybyske attempted to reconcile its holding with Kraft, stating that
the school district's actions in Cybyske did not directly attack the institution of mar-
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the political beliefs of one's spouse did not constitute marital status
discrimination under the Act.'13
The decision in Cybyske sparked concerns in the Minnesota Legisla-
ture."t 4 During legislative hearings on the expanded definition, Min-
nesota's Human Rights Commissioner Stephen Cooper explained
that the Cybyske ruling forced a dismissal of a number of complaints
in which employees were terminated because of the actions or situa-
tion of the employees' spouses.' 15 Commissioner Cooper explained
riage. The court contrasted this with the employer's antinepotism rule in Kraft which
constituted a "direct attack on the husband and wife as an entity and is contrary to
the 'legislative judgment [that] reflects the protected status the institution of mar-
riage enjoys in our society.'" Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 261 (quoting Kraft, 284 N.W.2d
at 388).
113. Id. at 261 (Act does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of political be-
liefs but prohibits discrimination on the basis of creed or religion.).
114. See Hearings on S.F. 1769 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Law of the Senate
Jud. Comm., 75th Minn. Leg., Feb. 19, 1988 (audio tape) (tape on file at the Legisla-
tive Reference Library). Senator Ember Reichgott, the bill's author, introduced the
expanded definition of marital status.
Senator Reichgott: Number one is a very important one, it's the marital status
provision and what it does is, you've heard of instances where there have
been, there might be a spouse who might be out and about active in the
various organizations or whatever and the spouse of that person is em-
ployed somewhere, may in fact have repercussions because they're married
to this person who is out and about creating trouble.
[Laughter]
Senator Reichgott: [Responding to laughter] Well it's true. Maybe I didn't say
it artfully but, in our law, of course, we have a provision which says you can't
discriminate on the basis of marital status, but what does that really mean?
What the courts have said is that what it means is you can't discriminate on
the basis if somebody is married or single. It doesn't say anything about
whether you can discriminate on the basis of what their spouse does, and
there is, in fact, a case recently that made that very clear, where a woman
was fired from her teaching position because her spouse was running
around apparently doing activities before the school board and raising
trouble. So, that decision made very clear that they [the courts] felt they
didn't have jurisdiction to cover that, and we need to change and broaden
the marital status definition so that it will now include protection against
discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a
spouse or former spouse.
115. See id. Commissioner Cooper explained the reason for the proposed marital
status definition to the subcommittee.
Commissioner Cooper: The first section as was set out before is put before you
to deal with a problem we've had at the department ever since the supreme
court ruled that the definition of marital status only included whether you
were or were not married. We've had a significant number of cases that
come to the department where somebody's clearly been terminated for the
actions of their spouse. A husband may be picked up for DWI, his wife who
works at a different company altogether, is fired when that gets in the news-
paper for something that has absolutely nothing to do with her her [sic]
abilities or lack of abilities. The complainant comes to the department and
says I've been discriminated against because of marital status. We have to
say, "No, you haven't as law is presently interpreted. Were you fired be-
cause you're married?" "No." "Then that's not a violation." It's our belief
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that, under the Cybyske holding, the Act is violated only when an em-
ployee is fired because she is married or single. The Act is not vio-
lated when an employee is fired because of the actions of a
spouse." t6
The Legislature limited the expanded definition of marital status
discrimination to employment cases because of its concern that the
expanded language would be inappropriate in a housing context.
Married individuals generally rent property together.' '7 The ex-
panded definition in a housing context would prohibit taking into
consideration the actions of one of the tenants as a basis for possible
eviction. t18 In order to avoid this interpretation, the Legislature lim-
that the Legislature initially intended the marital status discrimination to say
that each spouse stands on their [sic] own merits, ah, you're either fired or
hired or not hired or not fired based on your own merits. And this is an
attempt to define marital status. What we believe was always the Legisla-
ture's intent to say essentially each person stands or falls on their [sic] own
merits and not the behavior of their [sic] spouse.
116. See id.
117. See Hearing on S.F. 1769 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Law of the Senate
Jud. Comm., 75th Minn. Leg., Feb. 26, 1988 (audio tape) (tape on file at the Legisla-
tive Reference Library). This was the second meeting of the civil law subcommittee
in which the expanded marital status definition was restricted to employment.
[identity of speaker unknown] I don't know the ramifications of this. I'm sure
that in most cases that this probably makes sense. Are there some cases
certainly where it just, where certainly when you rent property to someone
you rent, you kinda rent, it to the person and their [sic] spouse. So the
spouse is somebody you don't consider. I don't know. You people know
the hypotheticals better than me.
Senator Reichgott: Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that was the concern raised by
Minnesota Multi-Housing and that's why I think the Commissioner has de-
cided to just restrict it to employment situations.
118. See Hearing on H.F. 2054 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Law of the Senate
Jud. Comm., 75th Minn. Leg., Feb. 26, 1988 (audio tape) (tape on file at the Legisla-
tive Reference Library). Representative Allen Quist and Commissioner Stephen
Cooper speaking:
Representative Quist: This applies not only to employment but also to housing,
does it not?
Commissioner Cooper: It applies to employment and it applies to, I believe it
does apply to housing, but let me just check...
Representative Quist: Employment and housing might be different situations if
you're talking about a spouse. I don't have any problem with former spouse
but if you're talking about a spouse, it seems to me if we're saying that you
can't discriminate with regards to housing as to the identity, situation, ac-
tions, or belief of a spouse, that, that's an extremely broad kind of concept
because a person's spouse normally could have just a whole lot of impact on
housing so, and I'm not sure what that would be.
I guess things that come to mind include things like out in is it Utah,
where you've got these polygamists you know, where you know we've all
read about these situations where people have intense religious beliefs
about maintaining polygamy and I think it's bizarre, but I mean, those kinds
of things happen. And what this would say if it applies to housing is that you
can't consider what the beliefs, actions and so on of a person's spouse are.
And I mean, you've got cases where spouses out there are shooting at and,
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ited the expanded definition to employment cases." 19
At no time during the legislative hearings on the amendment did
the authors of the amendment, the Commissioner of Human Rights,
or other House and Senate members state an intention to preclude
protection of unmarried cohabitation. Indeed, this protection was
already provided both by the court's interpretation of marital status
discrimination in prior cases' 2 0 and by the 1973 Legislature.'
2'
Rather, the focus of this amendment was to clarify that marital status
discrimination includes the identity, situation, actions or beliefs of
one's spouse or former spouse. The Legislature resolved this issue
by adopting this amendment.
Although the French court refused to "include what the legislature
excluded' 2 2 in its interpretation of marital status discrimination, it
excluded what the Legislature included. The Legislature intended to
differentiate between landlords who had not entered the marketplace
and those who had entered the commercial arena. The distinction
was made by providing a partial exemption for landlords living on
the rented property. Landlords must either meet the criteria for the
housing exemption or comply with the Act.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted a similar distinction for em-
ployment cases in the Sports and Health Club 123 decision. Differentiat-
ing between an employer engaged in a business for profit and a
religious corporation, the court noted that the Act provided an ex-
in fact, not only shooting at but shooting and killing law enforcement of-
ficers. Now, that's an extreme case, but if you can't consider the actions of a
person's spouse on housing, I think that's weird.
119. See Hearing on H.F. 2054 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Law of the House
Jud. Comm., 75th Minn. Leg., Mar. 2, 1988 (audio tape) (tape on file at the Legisla-
tive Reference Library). At the second meeting of the subcommittee, Representative
Loren Solberg, one of the bill's authors, and Commissioner Stephen Cooper ex-
plained that the marital status definition would apply only to employment situations.
Representative Solberg: In response to concerns from last meeting... Repre-
sentative Quist had raised a concern during the original testimony about
marital status. The proposed language that's before us is a definition of
what marital status means, it's something Representative Quist and Com-
missioner Cooper are comfortable with.
Commissioner Cooper: Basically, the only change here was to address the con-
cerns that were raised in the last committee meeting about housing situa-
tions if your husband or your wife is causing a problem, would that prevent
you from getting evicted under the expanded language. So what we did was
clarify that the expanded language addresses only employment, so that's the
only change. It's to clarify that the other two sections of the bill are not
affected by the expanded language.
120. See State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985); State
v. Porter Farms, 382 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
121. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
122. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 7 (Minn. 1990).
123. 370 N.W.2d at 853.
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emption for religious corporations.124 Upon entering into the busi-
ness arena to participate in the secular marketplace, however, an
employer is subject to the standards proscribed by the Legislature in
preventing "pernicious discrimination."125
The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to recognize this distinc-
tion in French. Rather, the court stated, "in non-employment cases,
• . . only the status of the individual, not an individual's relationship
with a spouse, fiance, fianc&e, or other domestic partner," is pro-
tected from marital status discrimination.126 The majority refused to
protect the unmarried, cohabiting couples the Legislature intended
to protect.
b. Minnesota's Fornication Statute
Minnesota's fornication statute makes it a misdemeanor "when any
man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other."127
The majority in French relied on the existence of Minnesota's fornica-
tion statute as evidence of the Minnesota public policy favoring the
institution of marriage128 and thereby denied unmarried, cohabiting
couples the statutory protection of freedom from discrimination in
access to housing.129
The court's reliance on Minnesota's fornication statute necessi-
tates an examination of that statute and the validity of any inferences
which may be made from its existence. In particular, three issues
deserve consideration. The first is whether the existence of the for-
nication statute sufficiently implies the legislative intent of denying
cohabiting couples protection from marital status discrimination.
The second is whether the statute violates an individual's right to
privacy. The third is whether the fornication statute is
constitutional.
(1) The Fornication Statute and Public Policy
The fact that the fornication statute has not been repealed permits
a state to prosecute an individual for fornication.130 The majority in
124. Id. (The Act contains exemptions for religious corporations in certain con-
texts.); see also MINN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 1(2) (1990) (A religious corporation may
be exempted from compliance with the Act when religion is a bona fide occupational
qualification for employment.).
125. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 853 (A state's interest in eliminating dis-
crimination would be frustrated if nonreligious business were allowed to discriminate
solely because of sincerely held religious beliefs.).
126. French, 460 N.W.2d at 6 (emphasis in original).
127. MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (1990).
128. French, 460 N.W.2d at 6.
129. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
130. French, 460 N.W.2d at 6. The majority opinion strongly objected to the as-
sertion that the fornication statute had "fallen into complete disuse." Id. However,
[Vol. 17
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French, construed the existence of a fornication statute to embody a
public policy against unmarried cohabitation and to reflect the Legis-
lature's intent to deny protection to unmarried couples who attempt
to rent housing.131 One indicator of whether the existence of the
fornication statute accurately expresses current social mores is the
frequency with which the statute has been used as a basis for
prosecution.
The last reported conviction for fornication occurred in 1927.132
In the context of unmarried cohabitation, the last reported convic-
tion occurred in 1914.133 Subsequent case law indicates that the
state no longer attempts to regulate nonmarital, heterosexual activity
between two consenting adults when such activity is conducted in the
privacy of an individual's home.13 4 This lack of prosecution and en-
forcement of unmarried cohabitation is inconsistent with a public
policy which allegedly condemns unmarried cohabitation.
(2) Right to Privacy
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the constitu-
tional right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.'35 Griswold provided
constitutional protection for the childbearing decisions of married
couples. The right to contraception established in Griswold was ex-
tended to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird 136 on an equal
protection theory.13 7 Justice Brennan's opinion, however, allowed
the state legislature discretion in creating laws preventing the act of
the dissent states: "Although the legislature has refused to repeal Minnesota's forni-
cation statute .... it has fallen into disuse." Id. at 19. The dissent asserted there
were only two reported convictions for fornication in Minnesota, the last in 1927, and
that "police and prosecutors generally consider the fornication statute unenforce-
able." Id.
131. French, 460 N.W.2d at 5 (The court stated that marital status does not include
unmarried cohabiting couples as this would be inconsistent with public policy and
legislative intent.).
132. See State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 222, 213 N.W. 920 (1927).
133. See State v. Gieseke, 125 Minn. 497, 147 N.W. 663 (1914). The married de-
fendant was involved in a sexual relationship with a woman who worked and lived on
his farm. Id. at 506, 147 N.W. at 667. The defendant's wife and five children also
resided upon the farm. Id. at 506, 147 N.W. at 666. The Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction for fornication. Id. at 506, 147 N.W. at 667.
134. But see State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 880 (Minn. 1987). The defendant-
school administrator was involved in sexual activity with high school students who
attended the school in which defendant was employed. The defendant was initially
charged with fornication and sodomy but those charges were not prosecuted after
defendant pled guilty to other charges. Id at 881. See also State v. Sauer, 217 Minn.
591, 15 N.W.2d 17 (1944) (The court affirmed defendant's conviction on the charge
of keeping a disorderly house for persons to engage in unlawful sexual intercourse.).
135. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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fornication.138 The United States Supreme Court declined the op-
portunity in Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library 13 9 to address the
state's proper role in regulating sexual behavior. In Hollenbaugh, two
library employees were fired from their positions because they were
"living together in 'open adultery.' "140 Thus, although the
Supreme Court has recognized a right of privacy in areas concerned
with marriage,141 the family, and procreation, that right "in no way
interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or
misconduct." 142
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not addressed the right of pri-
vacy for unmarried cohabiting couples. In In re Agerter,' 43 however,
the court examined a judge's right to privacy in response to allega-
tions of sexual misconduct. In Agerter, an informal complaint alleged
that a judge was having a sexual relationship with the complainant's
ex-wife. 144 The Board on Judicial Standards obtained a subpoena
requiring the judge to appear before the Board for an inquiry into
the allegations. Ruling on a motion to quash, the court determined
that enforcement of the subpoena would violate the judge's right to
privacy. 145
The court's analysis in Agerter examines the right of the state to
intrude into the intimate affairs of an individual. The court stated
that the "protectable right of informational privacy depends on a
balancing of the competing interests of the individual in keeping his
or her intimate affairs private and the government's interest in know-
138. Id. at 449.
139. 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
140. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (W.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978). Although the
Court did not grant certiorari, Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion. He as-
serted that the personal choice of living arrangements is sufficiently close to other
fundamental constitutional guarantees recognized by the Court and should receive
more than the minimum rationality tier of equal protection analysis. Hollenbaugh, 439
U.S. at 1056. Justice Marshall expressed doubt that the employee's termination
would survive even the relaxed scrutiny of the rational-basis test. Id. at 1056-57.
141. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The United States Supreme
Court invalidated a state law which required noncustodial parents to obtain court
permission for marriage when the parent was under a court order to provide child
support payments. Id. at 386.
142. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
143. 353 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1984). This case involved an alleged disciplinary
violation by a Minnesotajudge. The investigation by the Board on Judicial Standards
investigated a complaint that the judge had an alcohol problem and was involved in a
sexual relationship with complainant's ex-wife. Id. at 910.
144. Id.
145. Id. Although the judge asserted that the subpoena would also violate his
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ing what those affairs are when public concerns are involved."146 In
order to intrude on the judge's right to privacy, the court stated that
an important public interest must be shown.147 The public interest
involved the possibility that the judge's conduct might bring the judi-
cial office into disrepute. The court stated that the existence of adul-
tery or fornication statutes did not make the allegations of the
complaint any less speculative. Therefore, the court refused to com-
pel the judge to disclose this information.148
Contrasting Agerter with French 149 shows the inconsistency of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in addressing privacy matters. The court
never acknowledged the tenant's right to privacy nor the landlord's
interest in making the inquiry.150 As in Agerter, the existence of a
fornication statute does not make the intrusion into the intimate sex-
ual lives of prospective tenants any more justifiable. There must be
an important state interest which would justify the intrusion into
what the court has recognized as a privacy interest.t51
146. Id. at 913 (citation omitted) (At issue is the state's right to compel disclosure
of private information.).
147. Id. at 915. The court asserted that ajudge's right to privacy, was "admittedly
less pervasive than the private citizen's." Id.
148. Id. at 915. The court balanced the right of the individual to keep intimate
affairs private against the government's interest when public concerns are involved.
Id. at 913.
149. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 18 (Minn. 1990) (The landlord admitted
he did not know whether the prospective tenants would engage in sexual activity on
the property.).
150. Privacy issues are also raised by the use of tenant screening services. These
services are being used in some areas of the country to offer data on prospective
tenants to landlords. The services use advanced computer technology to provide a
wide range of data to subscribing landlords.
The tenant screening services operate in a manner similar to credit bureaus.
The landlord subscribes to the service and provides the name of the applicant tenant
to the service. If the information on the tenant is contained within the database of
the company, the landlord may purchase the information. See Note, Tenant Blacklist-
ing: Tenant Screening Services and the Right to Privacy, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 239-40
(1987).
At present, these services are unregulated and pose concerns regarding the pri-
vacy of prospective tenants. Because computer technology dramatically expands the
capacity of the services to provide information on a prospective tenant, information
may be provided which the tenant would not choose to disclose. In addition,
although information may be initially disclosed by the tenant in one context, once
placed in a computer data base, the subsequent disclosure may be without the ten-
ant's consent. See id at 247-50.
Generally, companies have information in at least one of three possible catego-
ries: (1) information from public records; (2) credit information; and/or (3) infor-
mation on the lifestyle of the prospective tenant. Only legislative action can provide
protection to the tenant's right to privacy by limiting the type of information pro-
vided to that which is relevant in tenant selection. See id. at 242-44.
151. The governmental interest in the fornication statute may include interests in
preserving the family, preventing disease, deterring illegitimacy and promoting mo-
19911
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(3) Constitutional Validity
ChiefJustice Popovich, dissenting in French, questioned the consti-
tutionality of Minnesota's fornication statute.152 He stated: "While a
challenge to the fornication statute is not before us, other states have
struck down their fornication statutes under equal protection."1 3
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United State Constitution provides: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' 54 Although a state is not required to
treat all individuals the same, equal protection requires that groups
similarly situated be treated equally.
The application of the equal protection clause to Minnesota's for-
nication statute requires an examination of whether similarly situated
individuals are treated disparately. Because the fornication statute
punishes only men and single women for fornication, it is necessary
to also examine Minnesota's adultery statute in order to determine
whether there is, in fact, unequal treatment.
Minnesota's adultery statute provides: "When a married woman
has sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband, whether
married or not, both are guilty of adultery and may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of
not more than $3000, or both."t55 Contrast the punishment for
adultery with the punishment for fornication, which constitutes a
misdemeanor. As defined by Minnesota law, a "[m]isdemeanor
means a crime for which a sentence of not more than 90 days or a
fine of not more than $700, or both, may be imposed."156
An initial examination of the adultery and fornication statutes indi-
cates a classification on the basis of marital status. Married women
receive harsher penalties for sexual intercourse as compared with
single women. However, marital status distinctions have not been
considered either a suspect class or fundamental interest by the
United States Supreme Court. 157 Thus, any challenge to the marital
status classification would be subject to the traditional standard of
rality. Whether the fornication statute is an appropriate means for accomplishing
these objectives deserves both legislative and judicial consideration. See Note, Forni-
cation, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REv. 252, 301 (1978).
152. French, 460 N.W.2d at 19. The dissent stated: "Although the legislature has
refused to repeal Minnesota's fornication statute, and it may be of questionable con-
stitutionality, it has fallen into disuse."
153. Id.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
155. MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (1990).
156. Id. § 609.02, subd. 3.
157. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449 (1971). Justice Brennan conceded
that the legislature has "a full measure of discretion in fashioning means to prevent
fornication." However, the state's objective in prohibiting contraception was incon-
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review which, assuming the existence of a constitutionally permissi-
ble goal, would survive challenge.158
A closer examination of the two statutes indicates a second level of
unequal treatment. Similarly situated men and women are treated
disparately on the basis of gender in two ways. First, married wo-
men are treated more harshly than married men. A married woman
is always guilty of adultery, whether she engages in sexual inter-
course with a married or single man. A married man, however, will
be only guilty of fornication when he engages in sexual intercourse
with a single woman. Second, single men will be treated more
harshly than similarly situated single women. A single man will be
guilty of adultery if he engages in sexual intercourse with a married
woman. A single woman, however, will be guilty of fornication only
if she engages in sexual intercourse with a married man.
The governmental objectives reflected in these gender classifica-
tions are subjected to an intermediate standard of review.' 59 This
requires an important objective and the means employed must be
substantially related to the government's objective.160 The majority
in French states that Minnesota's public policy discourages fornica-
tion and protects the institution of marriage.l61 Assuming that this
objective is important, the issue is whether the fornication statute is
substantially related to this objective. Another way of examining this
issue is to ask whether there is an alternative means to accomplish
this objective without raising constitutional concerns. Clearly, the
sistent with the equal protection clause in its denial of distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried but not married individuals. Id. at 454.
158. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1910). The
Court stated:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and there-
fore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or be-
cause in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary.
Id.
159. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). "To withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 197.
160. Id.
161. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Minn. 1990).
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statutes could be made gender neutral and thus avoid the disparate
treatment accorded on the basis of gender.
In Purvis v. State,' 62 the Supreme Court of Florida declared the
state fornication law unconstitutional. The Florida statute provided:
"If any man commits fornication with a woman, each of them shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree."163 The state com-
mon law defined fornication as "illicit sexual intercourse between
either a married or an unmarried man and an unmarried woman
... "t64 This definition drew a gender-based distinction between
married women and married men. In comparing Florida's fornica-
tion statute and adultery statute, the result was that a married woman
and her partner could not be punished for isolated instances of sex-
ual intercourse, whereas a married man could be.165 The court held
that the gender-based classification did not bear even a rational rela-
tionship to a permissible state objective and declared it violative of
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.166
(4) Summary
In Sports and Health Club, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
an employer violated the antidiscrimination statute when he refused
to hire applicants who were cohabiting with members of the opposite
sex. 167 The court found a single job applicant's consensual hetero-
sexual activity irrelevant to a decision regarding employment. Simi-
larly, a prospective tenant's consensual sexual activity is irrelevant to
the determination of whether the individual is an acceptable tenant.
To allow a landlord to refuse housing on the basis of cohabitation
with the opposite sex amounts to an attack on the Act's prohibition
of discrimination based on marital status. 168 Justifying an intrusion
into the intimate lives of prospective tenants on the dubious ration-
ale that such an intrusion reflects public policy against cohabitation
162. 377 So. 2d 674, 679 (Fla. 1979).
163. Id. at 676 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1977), repealed in 1983).
164. Purvis, 377 So. 2d at 676 (quoting De Laine v. State, 262 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla.
1972)).
165. Id. ("[T]he distinction drawn by the fornication statute is not offset or cured
by the existence of these other laws [prohibition of living in open adultery and prosti-
tution statutes].").
166. Id. at 677.
167. State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
168. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 20 (Minn. 1990). The French dissent
stated:
In substance, appellant argues even if it is not against your religious beliefs
for persons of the opposite sex to live together, you can still discriminate
against these people if you personally disagree with them living together.
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violates the Legislature's clear intent to provide equal access to
housing.
B. Inquiry as a Violation
The Act states that, in regards to real property:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice... [to] make any record or
inquiry in connection with the prospective purchase, rental, or
lease of real property which expresses, directly or indirectly, any
limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, creed,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to
public assistance, disability, or familial status, or any intent to make
any such limitation, specification, or discrimination .... 169
The language of the statute indicates that any inquiry which directly
or indirectly expresses a limitation, specification, or discrimination
with regard to the protected classes constitutes an unfair discrimina-
tory practice. It is doubtful that this section of the statute would be
troublesome if the area of discrimination centered on race, color, or
national origin. However, the clear meaning of the statute has been
clouded by dicta from the court in the area of marital status
discrimination. 1 70
The dissent in French, explicitly states: "The Human Rights Act
prohibited appellant from even inquiring about Parsons' marital sta-
tus.., and Parsons and [her fianc6] had absolutely no duty to protest
their innocence when illegally questioned." 17 The majority opinion
addressed, only indirectly, the issue of illegal inquiry into an individ-
ual's marital status.' 72 The relevant issue is whether inquiry into an
individual's marital status is a violation of the Act's prohibition
against marital status discrimination.
Sports and Health Club directly raises the issue of illegal inquiry.
The majority stated that an employer should be allowed leeway in
the questioning of job applicants regarding their "background, up-
bringing and perspective."1 73 However, in this case, the employer
went "far beyond legally permissible bounds in questioning appli-
cants and employees."m74 According to the findings of the ALJ, the
169. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 2(1)(c) (1990).
170. See infra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
171. French, 460 N.W.2d at 18 (Dissent stated that prospective tenants had no duty
to answer when illegally questioned.).
172. See id. at 5-6. The majority opinion's reference to the inquiry issue was only
used to support the assertion that direct evidence of fornication is unnecessary. Any
unequal treatment because of cohabitation does not constitute marital status discrim-
ination. Id.
173. State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 849-50 (Minn. 1985)
(Leeway is necessary in order to allow the employer to make an informed employ-
ment decision.).
174. Id. at 850.
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questioning regarding marital status consisted of asking:
[S]ingle persons who live away from home whom they live with
and, if they live with an unrelated member of the opposite sex to
whom they are romantically attached, they presume he/she is a for-
nicator and will not hire them. The basic reason for these inquiries
is their belief that persons who are on the "wrong" side of the
above-listed "litmus test" questions relating to marital status and/
or sex are either immoral or lack the requisite "teachable spirit"
and "disciplined life style" they look for in an employee.
175
The specific nature of the ALJ findings, combined with the affirm-
ance by the court that this questioning constitutes marital status dis-
crimination,176 should support the dissent's position in French that
the landlord's inquiry was illegal. However, a footnote to the major-
ity opinion in Sports and Health Club injects a confusing element.1
7 7
The footnote referenced Justice Peterson's dissent in which he
states:
[I]t is only a discriminatory employment decision of the employer,
not the inquiy itself, that should invoke the state's concern. The fact
of the inquiry may prove the inquirer's knowledge of a person's
religion or marital status and tie an inference from that knowledge
to an otherwise unexplained adverse decision, but the [ALJ] made
no such linkage .... 178
In the footnoted reference to this argument, the majority stated:
Justice Peterson, in dissent argues that the discrimination claim
predicated upon questioning of employees and applicants on co-
habitation of unmarried persons is not a ground under the statute
for finding discrimination. Even though we agree with his conten-
tion, yet the record appears clear to us that Sports and Health went
far beyond permissible bounds in questioning employees and ap-
plicants in areas clearly prohibited by the act.179
Thus, the majority appears to be saying that evidence of inquiry
into the cohabitation arrangements of unmarried persons is not, in
itself, sufficient to support a finding of marital status discrimination.
Yet, in Sports and Health Club, the majority affirmed the ALJ's finding
of discrimination based on inquiry alone. There are three possible
175. State v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., HR-82-005-RL, slip op. at 50-51 (OAH
Apr. 26, 1984). Furthermore, the employer
believe[d] that women are subordinate to men and should have the permis-
sion of the "responsible" men in their lives (husbands, fathers) to work and/
or live away from home; ... [and] want[ed] to know who was "at fault" and
presume[d], unless shown otherwise, that the woman was in instances in-
volving persons who are or who have been divorced ....
Id. at 50.
176. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 854 (ALJ's findings supported by sub-
stantial evidence.).
177. Id. at 850 n.10.
178. Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 850 n.10.
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interpretations of this inconsistency which may reconcile the major-
ity dicta with the majority decision.
The first interpretation involves the three-part analysis required
for discrimination claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
This analysis requires the establishment of a prima facie case by the
plaintiff, a rebuttal by the defendant, and a response to the rebuttal
by the plaintiff. 180 In employment cases, the plaintiff must have been
a member of a protected class; must have met the minimum qualifica-
tions of the job; must have been denied employment despite the
qualifications; and the defendant must have continued to seek appli-
cants with similar qualifications.181 Inquiry alone leads to an infer-
ence of discrimination. Where there is no available information
regarding the applicant actually hired by the employer, then the
prima facie case is incomplete.18 2
Applying these elements to a housing context, the plaintiff must be
a member of a protected class, must have met the minimum criteria
for an acceptable tenant, must have been denied housing despite
meeting the criteria, and the landlord-owner must have continued to
seek tenants with similar qualifications. The ALJ's findings indicate
that French did not rent the subject property to any other tenants
after refusing to rent to Parsons. Had the landlord in French pro-
vided no explanation for the denial of housing, then the prima facie
case would be incomplete. Strict application of the required prima
facie elements precludes a finding of discrimination as the landlord
did not continue to seek other tenants with similar qualifications.183
French, however, clearly stated that his refusal to rent was based on
his objections to Parsons unmarried cohabitation.184 Thus, no fur-
ther evidence of discriminatory conduct is necessary to constitute a
prima facie case for discrimination.
The second interpretation is that the inquiry must be directly
linked to a discriminatory act before there can be a finding of dis-
crimination. In employment cases, there must be evidence that the
180. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
181. See Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn. 1978) (citations omitted)
(Plaintiff needs to show only the bare essentials of unequal treatment to establish the
prima facie elements.); State v. Mower County Social Servs., 434 N.W.2d 494, 498
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Elements constitute prima facie case of disparate treatment.);
State v. Hennepin County, 420 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (Only when
these elements are established should the ALJ proceed to next stage of analysis.).
182. See State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., HR-82-005-RL, slip op. at 23 (OAH
Apr. 26, 1984). The ALJ stated that the prima facie case was dicta only and thus not a
binding test. In Sports & Health Club, the ALJ departed from the strict application of
the prima facia case in the finding of religious and marital status discrimination. Id.
at 23-25.
183. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990).
184. Id. at 3 (French told Parsons it was inconsistent with his religious beliefs for
unmarried adults of the opposite sex to live together.).
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employer refused to hire or terminated an employee on the basis of
prohibited discrimination.185 This interpretation would supportJus-
tice Peterson's argument that the inquiry be linked to an adverse de-
cision.186 Justice Peterson specifically referenced one of the
complainants in Sports and Health Club who, following the inquiry into
his personal life and an explanation of the religious beliefs under
which the club operated, did not fill out a job application.' 8 7 Yet, the
ALJ found the employer's conduct discriminatory because he im-
properly asked for information regarding the applicant's religion.188
Justice Peterson's argument focused on the lack of a discriminatory
act when an applicant decides not to apply for employment.
Applying this interpretation to French, a prospective tenant must
actually apply to rent and the landlord must refuse to rent the prop-
erty. Only then will there be the requisite discriminatory act. Had
Parsons decided not to rent the property there would be no violation
of the Act based on illegal inquiry. However, the facts are clear that
Parsons applied for, and entered into, an agreement to rent the
property from French.189 Subsequent to this rental agreement,
French rejected Parsons on the basis of her marital status. There is
the requisite direct link between Parsons' application for rental,
French's inquiry, and French's subsequent discriminatory act of re-
scinding the rental agreement. Therefore, the prima facie case is
complete.
The facts in French support a finding that French's inquiry violated
the Act. In contrast, however, the Sports and Health Club decision
found no such discriminatory act and yet affirmed the ALJ's finding
of discrimination.190 This inconsistency may be reconciled by refer-
ence to the ALJ's findings which indicate a departure from the rigid
requirements of a prima facie case.' 9 ' The ALJ stated that Minne-
sota's test for discriminatory treatment' 92 is one method of establish-
ing a prima facie case of discrimination. The unique facts in Sports
and Health Club, however, create inferences of religious and marital sta-
185. See supra text accompanying note 59.
186. State v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 869 (Minn. 1985).
187. Justice Peterson stated, "[t]he most obvious example is that of Joseph Wil-
liams, for the complaint was limited to the inquiry only." Id.
188. Id. at 846.
189. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990) (The landlord agreed to
rent the property and accepted Parsons' security deposit of $250.00.).
190. See Sports &Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 850 n.10.
191. See State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., HR-82-005-RL, slip op. at 23 (OAH
Apr. 26, 1984). The ALJ stated that rigid application of the Minnesota test would
leave the plaintiffs short of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. How-
ever, the test is dicta only and therefore not the only test which can be applied. Id.
192. See supra notes 60-63.
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tus discrimination.'19 These inferences may constitute a prima facie
case of illegal discrimination. These unique facts permit divergence
from a rigid application of the Minnesota test for discriminatory
treatment. ' 94
The third interpretation is supplied by Justice Yetka's majority
opinion.195 He contends that Justice Peterson asserted that where
there is a clear inference of sexual relations between cohabiting
couples, there is a violation of the fornication statute.' 96 This inter-
pretation is difficult to reconcile with the majority in Sports and Health
Club which affirmed the ALJ's finding and yet agreed with Justice Pe-
terson's assertion. If the fornication statute precludes a violation of
the Act when unmarried adults of the opposite sex cohabit, the Sports
and Health Club majority should not have affirmed the ALJ's findings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right of a landlord to choose tenants has been tempered with
the rights of tenants to choose the home and the community19 7 in
which they live. Both federal and state law have provided the protec-
tion and enforcement mechanisms necessary to insure that identified
classes are provided with freedom in their housing choices.198
Although traditional landlord-tenant law has been substantially
changed by judicial and legislative intervention, there remain areas
in which a landlord may legally discriminate in the selection of pro-
spective tenants.
The case of State v. French legalizes discrimination against unmar-
ried cohabiting couples in their access to housing. It allows land-
lords to inquire into the lives of prospective tenants, and to base
tenant selection on speculative conclusions about a prospective ten-
ant's personal and intimate affairs. The legitimization of personal
living arrangements as a criteria for tenant selection limits an indi-
193. See Sports & Health Club, HR-82-005-RL, slip op. at 24-25.
194. See id. The ALJ based this decision, in part, on the Fifth Circuit's departure
from a rigid prima facie case requirement in unique cases. The ALJ quoted federal
precedent which stated: " '[N]o single formulation of the prima facie evidence test
may fairly be expected to capture the many guises in which discrimination may ap-
pear. The focus of the inquiry may not be obscured by the blind recitation of a lit-
any.'" Id. at 24 (emphasis in ALJ's opinion) (quoting Byrd v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
687 F.2d 85, 86 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)).
195. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Minn. 1990).
196. Id. at 5-6 (Justice Yetka contends that this is the clearly established precedent
which leads to the conclusion that no marital status discrimination occurred in
French.).
197. Comment, Community, Home, and the Residential Tenant, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 627
(1986) (refusing a prospective tenant the right to choose any home restricts the ten-
ant from becoming a part of a community).
198. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
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vidual's right to privacy, choice of home and community, and denies
the basic freedom from discrimination which the Minnesota Human
Rights Act is designed to protect.
Donna Bailey
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